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Abstract
Disclosure of the NSA’s PRISM program demonstrated that Internet companies have become prime targets of government
surveillance. But what role do companies themselves play in putting users’ privacy at risk? By comparing the changes in
the privacy policies of ten companies—the nine in PRISM plus Twitter—I seek to understand how users’ privacy shifted.
Specifically, I study how company practices surrounding the life cycle of user information (e.g. collection, use, sharing, and
retention) shifted between the times when companies joined PRISM andwhen PRISM news broke. A qualitative analysis of
the changes in the privacy policies suggests that company disclosure of tracking for advertising purposes increased. I draw
on business scholar Shoshana Zuboff’s conceptualization of “surveillance capitalism” and legal scholar Joel Reidenberg’s
“transparent citizen” to explain the implications such changes hold for users’ privacy. These findings underscore why public
debates about post-Snowden privacy rights cannot ignore the role that companies play in legitimizing surveillance activi-
ties under the auspices of creating market value.
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1. Introduction: The Relationship between
Government and Corporate Surveillance
In August 2016, New Zealander Tony Fullman became
“the first person in the world to be publicly identified
as a confirmed” target of the NSA’s PRISM surveillance
program (Gallagher & Hager, 2016). Intelligence officials
in New Zealand believed Fullman and others were con-
cocting a plot to violently overthrow Fiji’s authoritarian
leader. According to documents that Edward Snowden
provided to The Intercept, an investigative news out-
let, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) used PRISM
to access Fullman’s Gmail and Facebook accounts and
turned over more than 190 pages of his communication
and private information, such as bank statements, to
New Zealand authorities. The information revealed no
evidence of a plot, and ultimately, the government never
brought charges against Fullman or others it investigated
(Gallagher & Hager, 2016).
While governments are certainly justified in inves-
tigating credible threats of violence, The Intercept’s in-
vestigation suggests that even before New Zealand’s au-
thorities received Fullman’s communications from the
NSA, they had scant evidence that the plot to assassi-
nate Fiji’s leader was, in fact, credible. Fullman exem-
plifies the “transparent citizen” (Reidenberg, 2015). By
using networked digital technologies now common in
everyday life, he becomes increasingly visible to institu-
tional actors like governments and companies, yet those
institutions’ use of his personal information remains ob-
scure. The rise of a transparent citizenry threatens pri-
vacy, undermines trust in rule of law, and challenges
international norms and data flows (Reidenberg, 2015).
PRISM targets non-U.S. persons located outside of the
U.S., but a report from the U.S. Privacy and Civil Lib-
erties Oversight Board ([PCLOB], 2014) found that as-
pects of the program also present privacy concerns for
U.S. persons.
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PRISM is a top-secret intelligence program in which
the NSA can compel U.S.-based companies to provide
information associated with certain “selectors”, such as
an email address or phone number. Selectors cannot
include individual names or other key words (PCLOB,
2014). The Snowden disclosures name nine U.S.-based
company partners: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook,
Paltalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple (Gellman &
Poitras, 2013). The program stems from legal authority
Congress granted to the U.S. government under Section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amend-
ments Act of 2008. The PCLOB reviewed PRISMandother
surveillance programs operating under the aegis of Sec-
tion 702 and concluded, “PRISM collection is clearly au-
thorized by the statute” (PCLOB, 2014, p. 9). Neverthe-
less, privacy and surveillance lawyers argue that Section
702’s overbroad scope and insufficient protections, com-
binedwith the government’s lack of transparency regard-
ing the operations of surveillance programs authorized
under Section 702, threaten the privacy and civil liberties
of those within and beyond the U.S. (Butler & Granick,
2016). In 2015, the Court of Justice of the European
Union invalidated the Safe Harbor agreement that per-
mitted U.S. companies to transfer the personal data of
E.U. citizens into the U.S. The court cited concerns with
the U.S. surveillance programs described in Snowden’s
disclosures, including PRISM (Ni Loideain, 2016).
The Snowden disclosures re-ignited a public conver-
sation about the extent to which governments should
access data that people generate in the course of their
daily lives. The act of governments obtaining data from
third parties such as companies is nothing new. However,
the rise of cloud computing and pervasive computing
coupled with inexpensive data storage has enabled com-
panies to store and retain increasing amounts of data,
giving governments more data to pursue (Bellia, 2008).
Indeed, “government and nongovernment surveillance
support each other in a complex manner that is often
impossible to disentangle” (Richards, 2013, p. 1940). Of
course, companies do not collect and store user infor-
mation with the goal of sharing it with the government.
Rather, the allure of big data entices companies to col-
lect and retain as much data as they can. Analyzing that
data enables companies to predict andmodify humanbe-
havior while also generating revenue andmarket control.
Such is the logic of surveillance capitalism, “a new social
relations and politics that have not yet been well delin-
eated or theorized” (Zuboff, 2015, p. 76).
In the wake of Snowden’s disclosures, several com-
panies denied giving the U.S. government “direct ac-
cess” to their servers, as PRISM was mistakenly first re-
ported to entail (Blodget, 2013). However, companies
are legally required to respond to national security de-
mands, such as those the government makes under
PRISM, and in some cases, companies facilitated this pro-
cess (Miller, 2013). Important debate continues about
the legality of Section 702, which authorizes PRISM and
other surveillance programs (Butler & Granick, 2016).
I argue that, in addition to interrogating the legality of
surveillance frameworks, conversations regarding post-
Snowden Internet policy must also examine the degree
to which companies’ own business practices can legiti-
mate surveillance of Internet users around the world.
Why study these companies? The nine U.S. compa-
nies named in Snowden’s PRISM disclosures are by no
means the only ones who engage in and benefit from
surveillance capitalism. And while disclosure of PRISM
certainly spotlighted these companies, several compa-
nies had already attracted significant public and regula-
tory attention due to privacy concerns before the news
broke. Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s decision to
explicitly include them in a secret surveillance program
suggests that their data holds particular value and that
their business practices related to that data deserve
closer examination. These companies collectively serve
billions of Internet users around theworld, meaning they
hold the power to respect or imperil the privacy rights of
many (MacKinnon, 2012).
In this vein, I analyze the changes in company privacy
policies over two time frames to understand how users’
privacy rights shifted since companies entered PRISM.
I focus onone aspect of privacy—the flowof user informa-
tion across the “the informational life cycle”, (Schwartz &
Solove, 2014, p. 892), which includes the collection, use,
sharing, and retention of user information (Kumar, 2016).
This translates to the following research question:
How did company practices surrounding the life cycle
of user information (its collection, use, sharing, and
retention) change in the time period spanning com-
panies’ entrance into PRISM and the program’s disclo-
sure to the public?
I don’t contend that PRISM caused the companies to
change their privacy policies. I suggest that while they
were part of PRISM, companies undermined their users’
privacy rights by expanding their use of targeted advertis-
ing, which is tantamount to tracking their users. This of-
fers evidence of the rise of surveillance capitalism, where
companies have business incentives to aggregate more
and more user information, and governments gain an at-
tractive trove of data to access for surveillance purposes.
The next section of this paper describes the various stake-
holders that influence company actions and outlines this
paper’s conception of users’ privacy rights online. Sec-
tion 3 explains the methods I used to locate and analyze
company privacy policies. Section 4 reviews privacy policy
changes related to the life cycle of user information, and
sections 5 and 6 examine what this analysis contributes
to debates about privacy rights in a post-Snowden world.
2. The Role of Companies in Respecting Users’ Online
Privacy Rights
Encouraging companies to act in ways that respect their
users’ privacy is a complex endeavor. Companies are ac-
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countable to several stakeholders: investors expect max-
imized returns and minimized risk; regulators expect ad-
herence to law; consumers expect valuable, trustwor-
thy products and services; civil society expects support
for the public interest. Evaluating companies according
to certain standards and comparing their performance
can incentivize competition among companies. It can
also provide valuable information to various stakehold-
ers, who can likewise pressure companies to performbet-
ter. The Ranking Digital Rights project (RDR) developed
criteria to evaluate companies in the information and
communications technology (ICT) sector on their respect
for free expression and privacy rights1 (Maréchal, 2015).
RDR’s criteria, which stem from nearly four years of
consultation and testing, build on several existing human
rights frameworks and principles and translate them into
concrete, measurable indicators. While imperfect, this
approach provides a mechanism to evaluate and com-
pare companies (Maréchal, 2015). RDR’s privacy indica-
tors draw from the Fair Information Practice Principles,
OECD Privacy Guidelines, European Union regulations,
and other frameworks (Ranking Digital Rights, 2016a).
The indicators related to company data practices focus
on company disclosure related to the collection, shar-
ing, use, and retention of user information as well as
users’ ability to access and control their own information
(Ranking Digital Rights, 2016b). Often, company disclo-
sure about these practices appears in a privacy policy.
Policy documents alone cannot reveal whether com-
panies respect privacy rights, but they do represent com-
pany practice. Privacy policies notify the public, and regu-
lators in particular, about a company’s privacy practices.
As such, they serve as an important source of informa-
tion to understand how users’ privacy rights fare online.
Scholars, journalists, and those in civil society have stud-
ied privacy policies for this purpose, and some privacy
policy research has taken a longitudinal approach (Jeong,
2016; Milne, Culnan, & Greene, 2006; Opsahl, 2010). In
this paper, I draw on my experience studying privacy
policies for RDR to evaluate how changes in the PRISM
company privacy policies suggest shifts in users’ privacy
rights. I particularly focus on changes related to the life
cycle of user information.
3. Locating and Analyzing Company Privacy Policies
This study compares versions of ten privacy policies in ef-
fect before and after two points in time:
1. The date the company entered PRISM, according
to documents from Snowden (Gellman & Poitras,
2013). These dates range from September 2007 to
October 2012.
2. June 6, 2013, the day the Washington Post pub-
lished its story on PRISM, alerting the public to the
program’s existence (Gellman & Poitras, 2013).2
It includes the nine companies implicated in PRISM as
well as Twitter, which attracted media attention for its
absence from the list of PRISM companies (Martin, 2013).
Since Twitter was not publicly named as a PRISM com-
pany, I only analyzed it for the second time frame.
Google and Twitter provide archives of their privacy
policies. For the remaining companies, I used the Inter-
net Archive’sWaybackMachine to find previous versions
of their privacy policies. Murphy, Hashim and O’Connor
(2007) suggest the Wayback Machine is a valid source
when examining website content and age. To check the
Wayback Machine’s validity for this study, I compared
versions of Google and Twitter’s policies from their com-
pany archives and the Wayback Machine. The text was
identical in both versions, except the Wayback Machine
version of one policy lacked a reference to Google’s
archive. This suggests the Wayback Machine provides
adequate representations of previous versions of pri-
vacy policies.
Table 1 lists the policies used for each company. All
companies except Paltalk included the date the policy
was last updated or the date the policy went into ef-
fect, which made it easy to determine when the poli-
cies changed. The first time frame includes three poli-
cies for Paltalk because the first updated policy only
contained a change in the company’s mailing address.
Paltalk’s second updated version included one substan-
tive change. Corporate oversight structures also influ-
enced which policies were reviewed. Google has owned
YouTube since 2006. During the first time frame, YouTube
maintained a separate privacy policy, so changes in its
policies are included in this analysis. By the second time
frame, Google’s privacy policy covered all of its services,
including YouTube, so that period does not include an
analysis of separate YouTube policies. Conversely, Mi-
crosoft bought Skype in 2011, but Skype maintained a
separate privacy policy during both time frames and is
included in both.
I used a difference-checking tool to identify the
changes in each company’s “before” and “after” poli-
cies. I logged each change in a spreadsheet. The addi-
tion or removal of an entire sentence represented one
change. If one sentence included several distinct edits, I
logged them separately. I looked at the original policies
to determine whether the change was substantive, us-
ing an inductive approach to develop codes related to
the substance of changes (Thomas, 2006). In the first
pass, I developed the codes and assigned them to each
change. I took a second pass through the entire dataset
and checked for consistency. Table 2 contains examples
of each code. These codes were mutually exclusive.
Overall, the policies included 814 changes, with Face-
book accounting for 651, or 80 percent. Facebook over-
hauled its policy during the first time frame and made
significant changes during the second time frame, far out-
pacing the number of changes from other companies. In
1 Until August 2016, I was a research analyst with the RDR project.
2 The Washington Post first reported the story on June 6, 2013 and updated its story on June 7, 2013 (Blodget, 2013).
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Table 1. Privacy policies analyzed across two time frames.
Company Date of Policy Timeframe 1: Date of Policy Date of Policy Timeframe 2: Date of Policy
Entered PRISM PRISM News
Microsoft Jan. 2006 Sept. 11, 2007 Oct. 2007 April 2012
June 6, 2013
Aug. 2013
Yahoo Nov. 22, 2006 Mar. 12, 2008 Oct. 28, 2008 May 31, 2013 Sept. 25, 2014
Google Aug. 7, 2008 Jan. 14, 2009 Jan. 27, 2009 July 27, 2012 June 24, 2013
Facebook Nov. 26, 2008 June 3, 2009 Nov. 19, 2009 Dec. 11, 2012 Nov. 15, 2013
Paltalk Oct. 7, 2009 Dec. 7, 2009 Feb. 7, 2010; May 19, 2013 No change
(crawled) Dec. 4, 2010 (crawled)
YouTube Mar. 11, 2009 Sept. 24, 2010 Dec. 8, 2010 See Google See Google
Skype Nov. 2010 Feb. 6, 2011 June 2011 Dec. 2012 Aug. 2013
AOL Feb. 14, 2011 Mar. 31, 2011 Mar. 30, 2012 May 14, 2013 June 28, 2013
Apple May 21, 2012 Oct. 2012 No change No change Aug. 1, 2013
Twitter N/A N/A N/A May 17, 2012 July 3, 2013
Table 2. Examples of substantive and non-substantive changes in privacy policies.
Substantive Changes Explanation or Example
Addition of information Added sentence: “When we display personalized ads, we take a number of steps designedto protect your privacy.”
Removal of information
Removed sentence: “You will only receive special offers via email from Paltalk if you have
indicated in your account preferences, or at some other time, that you would like to receive
them.”
More precise information
Added the bold phrase: “If we learn thatwe have collected the personal information of a child
under 13without first receiving verifiable parental consentwe will take steps to delete the
information as soon as possible.”
Less precise information
Changed the bolded phrase from: “If you are under 13, please do not attempt to register
for Facebook or send any information about yourself to us, including your name, address,
telephone number, or email address” to “If you are under age 13, please do not attempt to
register for Facebook or provide any personal information about yourself to us.”
Non-Substantive Changes
Simple fact change Changed the “Last updated” date in a policy.
Position change Moved a sentence from one paragraph in the policy to another.
Style change
Changed phrase from: “NOTICE: Click here for practical tips from the federal government
and the technology industry to help you guard against Internet fraud, secure your computer
and protect your personal information” to “The federal government and technology indus-
try have developed practical tips to help you guard against Internet fraud, secure your com-
puter and protect your personal information” [Hyperlink present in both sentences].
Fixing typos
Changed phrase from: “To protect your privacy and security, may use passwords to help ver-
ify your identity before granting access or making corrections to your AOL information” to
“To protect your privacy and security, we may use passwords to help verify your identity
before granting access or making corrections to your AOL information.”
total, the policies showed 424 substantive changes, with
Facebook accounting for 347, or 82 percent. This anal-
ysis focuses on the substantive changes. To answer the
question of what these policy changes suggest with re-
gard to the life cycle of user information, I again used
an inductive approach to develop codes related to digi-
tal rights, as framed by RDR’s indicators (Ranking Digital
Rights, 2016b; Thomas, 2006). In a first pass, I developed
and assigned the codes to each substantive change and
in a second pass, I checked for consistency. This yielded
11 codes across four themes. These codes were not mu-
tually exclusive, and 30 changes received two codes (25
of those changes applied to Facebook). Table 3 shows the
themes and the codes present in each. It also states how
many changes related to each theme appeared in Face-
book’s policies compared to other companies.
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Table 3. Digital rights themes and codes.
Digital Rights Theme Codes Included in Theme Number of Changes (Not Mutually Exclusive)
Management of user information Data collection, Use of data, 146 (Facebook: 133)
Retention, Security
Data sharing and tracking Third party, Data sharing, Tracking 149 (Facebook: 115)
User action More information, Choice 115 (Facebook: 89)
Corporate governance Accountability, Remedy 44 (Facebook: 35)
4. Policy Changes Related to the Life Cycle of User
Information
Two of the four digital rights themes focused on the
life cycle of user information: management of user
information and data sharing and tracking. Together,
these themes encompassed 70 percent of the substan-
tive changes. The following analysis describes what the
changes suggest for users’ privacy.
4.1. Management of User Information
Over both time frames, Facebook’s policies in particular
included many changes related to the company’s collec-
tion and use of information. Positively, changes during
the first time frame clarified what information the com-
pany requires when new users join, and what additional
information users can provide. The revised policy con-
tained clear examples of what Facebook considers user
content; the previous version of the policy told users to
check the company’s Terms of Use for a definition. How-
ever, the policy changes also disclose Facebook collect-
ingmore user information over both timeframes (see An-
nex Table A.1., rows 1–2, changes in bold).
Microsoft and Facebook included changes related to
retention. In the first time frame, Microsoft positively
added a sentence stating that it stores information about
a user’s behavior (e.g. page views, clicks, and search
terms) separately from information that identifies the
user (e.g., name, e-mail address) (see Table A.1., row
3). Somewhat positively, Facebook added a sentence de-
scribing a time frame in which it anonymizes data it re-
ceives fromadvertisers, but it applies only to information
the company doesn’t already have (see Table A.1., row 4).
This suggests that some advertising-related user informa-
tion is not subject to anonymization. In the second time
frame, Facebook stated that apps connected to Facebook
might retain user information after users delete the app
(see Table A.1., row 5). Facebook also added a sentence
saying users could contact the app directly and request
deletion of their data.
Overall, changes across both timeframes suggest
companies, primarily Facebook, provided additional de-
tail regarding what they collect and how they manage it.
In some cases, this can help users better understand com-
pany practices, for example what information they must
provide and what is optional.
4.2. Data Sharing and Tracking
Yahoo and Facebook included changes related to sharing
user information with governments, though the changes
do not appear to be linked to PRISM (see Annex Ta-
ble A.2., rows 1–2). Yahoo stated that it responds to
law enforcement requests; PRISM requests fall under na-
tional security. Facebook added a sentence stating that
it may disclose user information in response to requests
from foreign jurisdictions; PRISM requests come from
the U.S. government.
Several companies added information to policies re-
lated to their use of targeted advertising: Microsoft and
YouTube in the first time frame; Skype, Yahoo, and Twit-
ter in the second time frame; and Facebook across both
timeframes. Changes in Facebook’s policies appeared to
give the company wider latitude in sharing user informa-
tion, particularly with advertisers.
In the first time frame, Microsoft added more com-
panies as advertising partners. It also listed the types of
data it uses to target advertising (see Table A.2., row 3).
Microsoft added that advertising networks compile infor-
mation “over time” about where users click or see ad-
vertisements and may “associate this information with
your subsequent visit, purchase or other activity on par-
ticipating advertisers’ websites in order to determine the
effectiveness of the advertisements”. Finally, Microsoft
removed a sentence from its policy, raising questions
about its access to advertising networks’ cookies (see Ta-
ble A.2., row 4). Changes in YouTube’s policies state that
it shows users advertising evenwhen they are logged out,
that advertisers can serve ads based on demographic cat-
egories inferred from users’ behavior, and that they can
serve ads based on user information obtained fromother
companies (see Table A.2., rows 5–7).
In the second time frame, Yahoo added two sen-
tences to its policy that explain how it uses device iden-
tifiers to target advertising, framed in the parlance of
personalization (see Table A.2., row 8). Twitter added
two sentences about user information it may receive
from advertising partners (see Table A.2., row 9). Skype
added language suggesting that third-party advertise-
ments would appear on its various sites and that Skype
and its advertising partners would receive information
(changes in bold) “about your relationship with and use
of Skype’s websites, software, and products…”.
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Changes in Facebook’s policies over both time frames
appeared to give the company wider latitude to share
information, particularly with advertisers. In the first
time frame, Facebook removed the phrase stating that it
shares information with third parties “only in limited cir-
cumstances”. The policy gained two sentences explaining
what types of information Facebook uses when targeting
advertising and how advertisers may interact with users.
Facebook stated it only uses non-personally identifiable
attributes but then stated that it may use sensitive, per-
sonal information to target advertising, and that adver-
tisers may be able to discern that information (see Table
A.2., row10). In the second time frame, Facebook revised
the following sentence about how it shares information
with advertisers (changes in bold):
2012: We only provide data to our advertising part-
ners or customers after we have removed your name
or any other personally identifying information from
it, or have combined it with other people’s data in a
way that it is no longer associated with you.
2013: We only provide data to our advertising part-
ners or customers after we have removed your name
and any other personally identifying information from
it, or have combined it with other people’s data in a
way that it no longer personally identifies you.
While the shift from “or” to “and” seems to provide
greater protection to users, the shift from the higher
threshold of association to the lower threshold of “per-
sonally identifiable” seems to negate that protection, be-
cause information that does not personally identify a
user can still be associated with a user and thus can iden-
tify the user. Facebook also revised its policy to more
clearly state that it uses all user information to target ad-
vertising (see Table A.2., row 11).
While these additions provide more detail for users
to understand company practices, the practices them-
selves appear to subject users to greater tracking for ad-
vertising purposes. They include examples of companies
tracking users in more circumstances and using more in-
formation to target those ads. The disclosures also use
jargon such as “non-personally identifiable information”
and “device identifiers” and they reference the data pro-
cessing techniques of inference and association, the nu-
ances of which are likely unfamiliar to average users. This
can make it difficult for anyone who actually reads pri-
vacy policies to fully understand what the policies mean.
5. Privacy Policy Changes Offer Evidence of
Surveillance Capitalism
Collectively, these privacy policy changes offer evidence
that suggests several of the world’s largest Internet com-
panies operate according to the logic surveillance cap-
italism. We cannot know whether these privacy policy
changes reflected actual changes in company practice
or if they provided more detail about practices in which
companies already engaged. But the changes suggest
that between the time the companies joined PRISM and
the public learned of PRISM, companies disclosed that
they managed more user information and, in particular,
broadened their targeted advertising.
Targeted advertising is the dominant business model
that powers most Internet companies today (Richards,
2013). This entails collecting data from individuals’ digital
interactions, however minor: “Facebook ‘likes’, Google
searches, emails, texts, photos, songs, and videos, lo-
cation, communication patterns, networks, purchases,
movements, every click, misspelledword, page view, and
more” (Zuboff, 2015, p. 79). Companies then employ ad-
vanced data analysis techniques to determine how to use
such data to extract revenue from advertisers, transform-
ing the data into what Zuboff calls “surveillance assets”
(2015, p. 80).
As a condition for using such services, people must
agree to terms such as those in privacy policies, whose
narrow definitions and vague language prevent people
from understanding how their data flows through the
life cycle of user information (Kumar, 2016). This model,
which puts the onus on users to manage their own pri-
vacy and hinges on whether they “consent” to such
practices, does not meaningfully protect users’ privacy
(Solove, 2013).
Beyond disclosing their practices in policies, compa-
nies justify their big data activities by arguing that users
gain something in return, for example, free services or
personalized experiences. People pay for these benefits
by foregoing their right to decide whether to disclose a
given facto or keep it to themselves. As such, surveillance
does not erode privacy rights; it redistributes them, en-
abling companies or governments to know information
about people without their ever having a choice (Reiden-
berg, 2015; Zuboff, 2015).
PRISM is one example of “the blurring of public and
private boundaries in surveillance activities...between
state security authorities and high tech firms” (Zuboff,
2015, p. 86). Companies collect and retain massive
amounts of data about their users—itself an act of
surveillance (Richards, 2013)—and the NSA can compel
companies to turn over that data for targeted surveil-
lance. The PCLOB report (2014) reviewed the checks and
balances under which the government’s PRISM program
operates. However, the surveillance activities of compa-
nies in PRISM do not operate with as much oversight. De-
bates about privacy rights in a post-Snowden world can-
not ignore the fact that companies have business incen-
tives to collect and retain the data that governments can
obtain through surveillance activities.
6. Conclusion: Government Surveillance as a Symptom
of Surveillance Capitalism
PRISM did not cause surveillance capitalism, but this
analysis suggests that PRISM companies further en-
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meshed themselves in it over the past decade. They
did so while belonging to a secret surveillance program
in which the U.S. government could compel them to
turn over all the information they had associated with
a given user’s email address or telephone number. The
PRISM companies serve billions of usersworldwide. They
have the power to adopt business practices that signifi-
cantly enhance the privacy of everyday users. This anal-
ysis of privacy policy changes that companies made be-
tween joining PRISM and PRISM’s disclosure to the pub-
lic suggests that companies went in the other direction
by expanding their use of targeted advertising. It illus-
trates that public debates about people’s privacy rights
in the wake of the Snowden disclosures must not ignore
the role that companies themselves play in legitimizing
surveillance activities under the auspices of creatingmar-
ket value.
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Annex
Table A.1. Privacy policy changes related to management of user information.
Company Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2
Pre-Join PRISM Post-Join PRISM Pre-PRISM Disclosed Post-PRISM Disclosed
1 Facebook 2008: “When you enter
Facebook, we collect
your browser type and IP
address.”
2009: “When you access
Facebook from a
computer, mobile phone,
or other device, wemay
collect information from
that device about your
browser type, location,
and IP address, as well as
the pages you visit.”
2 Facebook 2012: “This may include
your IP address and other
information about things
like your Internet service,
location, the type
(including identifiers) of
browser you use, or the
pages you visit.”
2013: “This may include
network and
communication
information, such as
your IP address or
mobile phone number,
and other information
about things like your
Internet service,
operating system,
location, the type
(including identifiers) of
the device or browser
you use, or the pages
you visit.”
3 Microsoft 2007: Added “For
example, we store page
views, clicks and search
terms used for ad
personalization
separately from your
contact information or
other data that directly
identifies you (such as
your name, e-mail
address, etc.).”
4 Facebook 2009: Added “If in any of
these cases we receive
data [from advertising
partners] that we do not
already have, we will
‘anonymize’ it within 180
days, meaning we will
stop associating the
information with any
particular user.”
5 Facebook 2013: Added that when
users delete an app
connected to Facebook,
“it [the app] may still
hold the information you
have already shared.”
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Table A.2. Privacy policy changes related to data sharing and tracking.
Company Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2
Pre-Join PRISM Post-Join PRISM Pre-PRISM Disclosed Post-PRISM Disclosed
1 Yahoo 2013: “We respond to
subpoenas, court orders,
or legal process or to
establish or exercise our
legal rights or defend
against legal claims.”
2014: “We respond to
subpoenas, court orders,
or legal process (such as
law enforcement
requests), or to establish
or exercise our legal
rights or defend against
legal claims.”
2 Facebook 2008: “We may be
required to disclose user
information pursuant to
lawful requests, such as
subpoenas or court
orders, or in compliance
with applicable laws.We
do not reveal
information until we
have a good faith belief
that an information
request by law
enforcement or private
litigants meets
applicable legal
standards.”
2009: “We may disclose
information pursuant to
subpoenas, court orders,
or other requests
(including criminal and
civil matters) if we have
a good faith belief that
the response is required
by law. This may include
respecting requests
from jurisdictions
outside of the United
States where we have a
good faith belief that the
response is required by
law under the local laws
in that jurisdiction,
apply to users from that
jurisdiction, and are
consistent with generally
accepted international
standards.”
3 Microsoft 2007: Added “For
example, we may select
the ads we display
according to certain
general interest
categories or segments
that we have inferred
based on “(a)
demographic data,
including any you may
have provided when
creating an account (e.g.
age, zip or postal code,
gender), general
demographic data
acquired from other
companies, and a
general geographic
location derived from
your IP address, (b) the
pages you view and links
you click when using
Microsoft’s and its
partners’ web sites and
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Table A.2. Privacy policy changes related to data sharing and tracking. (Cont.)
Company Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2
Pre-Join PRISM Post-Join PRISM Pre-PRISM Disclosed Post-PRISM Disclosed
3 Microsoft services, and (c) the
search terms you enter
when using Microsoft’s
Internet search services,
such as Live Search.”
4 Microsoft 2007: Removed
“Microsoft does not have
access to the cookies
that may be placed by
the third-party ad
servers or ad networks.”
5 YouTube 2009: “If you are logged
into your YouTube
Account, we may also
show you advertising
based on the
information you have
provided to us in your
YouTube Account.”
2010: “While you are
logged in or logged out
of your YouTube Account,
we may also show you
advertising based on non
personally identifiable
information you have
provided to us in your
YouTube Account.”
6 YouTube 2009: “Advertisers may
serve ads based on
interests associated with
non-personally
identifiable online
activity, such as videos
viewed, frequency of
uploading or activity on
other AdSense partner
sites.”
2010: “Advertisers may
serve ads based on
interests and
demographic categories
associated with
non-personally
identifiable online
activity, such as videos
viewed, frequency of
uploading or activity on
other AdSense partner
sites.”
7 YouTube 2009: “Advertisers may
also serve ads to you
based on previous
activity on that
advertiser’s website.”
2010: “Advertisers may
also serve ads to you
based on previous
activity on that
advertiser’s website or
based on non-personally
identifiable information
from other companies.”
8 Yahoo 2014: Added “We may
also set and access
device identifiers which
could include IP address,
user agent information
(browser version, OS
type and version), and
device provided
identifiers. Once you log
into Yahoo on your
device, Yahoo may
recognize your device to
provide you with a
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Table A.2. Privacy policy changes related to data sharing and tracking. (Cont.)
Company Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2
Pre-Join PRISM Post-Join PRISM Pre-PRISM Disclosed Post-PRISM Disclosed
8 Yahoo personalized experience,
independent of your
device settings.”
9 Twitter 2013: Added
“Third-party ad partners
may share information
with us, like a browser
cookie ID or
cryptographic hash of a
common account
identifier (such as an
email address), to help us
measure ad quality and
tailor ads. For example,
this allows us to display
ads about things you may
have already shown
interest in.”
10 Facebook 2009: Added “We allow
advertisers to choose the
characteristics of users
who will see their
advertisements and we
may use any of the
non-personally
identifiable attributes we
have collected (including
information you may
have decided not to
show to other users,
such as your birth year or
other sensitive personal
information or
preferences) to select
the appropriate audience
for those
advertisements...Even
though we do not share
your information with
advertisers without your
consent, when you click
on or otherwise interact
with an advertisement
there is a possibility that
the advertiser may place
a cookie in your browser
and note that it meets
the criteria they
selected.”
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Table A.2. Privacy policy changes related to data sharing and tracking. (Cont.)
Company Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2
Pre-Join PRISM Post-Join PRISM Pre-PRISM Disclosed Post-PRISM Disclosed
11 Facebook 2012: “We use the
information we receive,
including the
information you provide
at registration or add to
your account or timeline,
to deliver ads and to
make themmore
relevant to you.”
2013: “So we can show
you content that you
may find interesting, we
may use all of the
information we receive
about you to serve ads
that are more relevant to
you.”
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